Saturday, July 7, 2018

Welcome to our JULY 2018 Blog.........

Dear members and friends

Welcome to our July 2018 Blog where we focus this month on Indonesia's rise as a regional and World power plus, Terrorism, Education and 'Reformasi'-20 years on.

We hope you enjoys these current and excellent articles and you can access our blog by clicking below or 
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With our best regards

Lisa Bentley
Indonesia Institute Inc

7th  July 2018

Indonesia: A friend in the making & critical ally for Australia

By Hugh White

The arithmetic is clear: if Indonesia can keep growing at about 5 per cent a year for the next two or three decades, as it has done so far this century, it will become the world’s fifth-largest economy by 2040, and the fourth-largest by 2050; in sheer economic weight it will come in behind only China, India and the US.
Already by 2030 — when Australia’s new submarines may just be starting to enter service — its GDP will be three times Australia’s, and almost as big as Japan’s. Wealth is the ultimate foundation of national power, so that will make Indonesia, or should make Indonesia, a very powerful country. It will have the material resources to be a great power in Asia, able to exercise major influence over affairs not just in its immediate neighbourhood but also throughout our region. And it has the potential to be far more important to Australia than we have ever conceived.
It may even become as important to us as China, because while it will not match China’s wealth and power, it is much closer — and that could make all the difference. Never underestimate the importance of proximity.
And yet nothing about Indonesia today presages this. It hardly seems a country poised to become a great power and an arbiter of strategic affairs. On the contrary, it appears to be drifting along pretty much as it has for decades: a large, diverse, complex, self-absorbed and rather shambolic nation that still punches way below its weight on the regional stage, and barely registers globally.
It seems little able to make sense of the power it is steadily accruing as its economy grows, or of how to use this power. Here, then, is the paradox of Indonesia’s position in Asia today: economic growth is driving it towards a position of political and economic influence that it seems both uninterested in and incapable of exploiting.
To some in Australia this may sound like good news. The argument goes that the less Indonesia can turn its increasing economic weight into effective strategic power, the better. That’s understandable, because we have got used to thinking that we have more to fear than to hope for from our large neighbour.
For much of the 75 years since it emerged, rather unexpectedly, as a vast new state on our doorstep, Indonesia has appeared more as a liability than an asset on Australia’s strategic balance sheet.
At first, Sukarno’s unsettling brand of assertive nationalism raised credible fears both that ­Indonesia could threaten us ­directly and that it could offer more distant hostile powers access to territory close to our shores. It mostly looked a lot less threatening under Suharto’s New Order, which lasted from 1967 to 1998, but the potential for conflict never ­disappeared.
Indeed, after Australia’s retreat from Vietnam and until very recently, the possibility of conflict with Indonesia remained the principal focus of our defence policy, even though — despite recurring tensions over East Timor and West Papua — the risk has mostly been very remote.
Moreover, this perception of Indonesia as a potential danger has not been offset by any real sense that it could also be a major strategic asset to Australia, helping to shield us from more distant threats. That is because we have been so confident such threats could not arise while the US continued to exercise clear and uncontested strategic leadership in Asia; it has been easy to overlook Indonesia’s potential to help defend us as long as America’s power, which has kept the region so stable and peaceful for so long, seemed unassailable.
Some have long understood Indonesia’s potential as a strategic asset for Australia. As the Dibb review, a survey of Australia’s defence capacities, put it back in 1986, Indonesia “forms a protective barrier to Australia’s northern approaches”; the review emphasised our shared interest in keeping our neighbourhood “free from interference by potentially hostile external powers”. This reflects the simple fact that just as Indonesia is the only close neighbour strong enough to pose any serious threat to us, so too is it the only one strong enough to help us resist the intrusion of a potential adversary to within striking range of our shores.
And proximity means the two countries’ interests naturally align: a threat to one by a major external power must also threaten the other. This does not guarantee that Australia’s and Indonesia’s interests and objectives will always coincide in the face of a threat from outside our shared neighbourhood, but it does mean that such alignment is inherently more likely for Australia than with any other Asian major or middle power. Just as our closeness with Indonesia gives us many reasons or pretexts to be enemies, it also gives as many reasons to become allies. And this means that Indonesia’s growing power can be both good and bad news for Australia, making it both a more valuable potential ally and a more dangerous potential adversary.
But its potential as an ally is swiftly becoming more important to us as the wider order in Asia shifts. While the US remained the region’s dominant power we had nothing to fear from any state except Indonesia, but now we face a very different region in which America’s position is much weaker while China’s, in particular, is much stronger.
The central challenge for Australia’s foreign policy in the decades ahead will be to manage China’s growing power and influence, and to prevent it becoming a threat to us while maximising our independence and freedom of manoeuvre. Indonesia could be a critical ally for us in achieving that goal, quite possibly the most important ally we would have.
And the more powerful it becomes and the more effectively it learns to use its power, the more help to us it can be. So while we can never ignore Indonesia’s potential as a threat, its potential as an ally is more important to us now than it has ever been, and will become more important still over the decades ahead. That means we in Australia should hope that it can indeed realise its potential as a major power, and make sense of that power to use it effectively.
And it means we need to understand much better than we do now how likely that is to happen, and how events will unfold if it does.
Hugh White is professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University. This is an edited extract from his essay The Jakarta Switch, from Australian Foreign Affairs 3 — Australia & Indonesia, on sale from Monday.

Friday, June 1, 2018

Indonesia's 'Reformasi' - 20 years on.

By Resty Woro Yuniar and Jeffrey Hutton 
February 4, 1998, was a day that would change Desmond Junaidi Mahesa’s life forever and he never saw it coming. The social justice activist had left his office to attend a gathering after the Muslim festival of Eid in Jakarta, but he never made it to the celebration. Instead, he was approached by two men who grabbed him, threw a bag over his head and forced him into a car. About 40 minutes later, he found himself in a 2 x 2.5-metre room in an undisclosed location where he would be kept for the next two months.

Is Indonesia’s Reformasi a success, 20 years after Suharto?

His abductors grilled him about his activism, zeroing in on his support of then opposition leader Megawati Sukarnoputri, the daughter of Indonesia’s founding father Sukarno.
Twenty years have passed since that Wednesday, but Mahesa still vividly recalls the torture he endured under the authoritarian rule of the dictator Suharto.
To get Mahesa to speak, they beat him and gave him electric shocks.
“I was electrocuted by the kidnappers … I haven’t been able to grow hair ever since,” he told This Week in Asia at his office in parliament. “After I was released in April 1998, my friends told me not to go out in public because I was still being targeted by police.”
Protesters demand the Indonesian government probe human rights violations during the 1998 riots. Photo: AFP
Mahesa shared that cell with other prominent Indonesian activists such as Pius Lustrilanang, Andi Arief, Haryanto Taslam, Raharja Waluya Jati, and Faisol Riza.
According to testimony given to Jakarta Legal Aid Institute in 1998, the activists were burned, beaten and electrocuted while they were held captive. They were also stripped nude and forced to sit on blocks of ice.

America has come to terms with Indonesia’s past. Why can’t Indonesians?

Their captors were believed to be soldiers from “Team Rose”, a notorious unit of the country’s Kopassus special forces, led by Suharto’s much-feared former son-in-law, Prabowo Subianto.
Mahesa and the others were part of a group of 23 students, activists, and critics who were kidnapped during the twilight of Suharto’s 32-year rule, which the dictator dubbed the New Order, in late 1997 and early 1998. Suharto stepped down on May 21, 1998, after months of student-led protests driven by economic and political crises that plunged Indonesia into chaos. These historic events are commonly known as the country’s Reformasi (Reform) era.
Prabowo Subianto was widely believed to be behind activist abductions in 1997 and 1998. Photo: AP
Among the kidnapped group of 23, only nine were released. One was found dead and the rest are still missing.
“I feel like I escaped through a pinhole,” says Raharja Waluya Jati, co-founder of The People’s Democratic Party, which was among Suharto’s top critics. “If there wasn’t Reformasi, I’m sure I’d still be inside … not sure if I’d be alive or dead. I could only pray, we never knew whether we would make it out alive.”

Indonesia’s Widodo vowed to ‘erase stigma’ in Papua. Tell that to the separatists

Sine Reformasi, the political careers of the abducted activists have shone brightly, much like the republic they helped save two decades ago. However, in a stunning twist, Mahesa, along with three fellow victims, has joined the Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra), founded by the very man that many suspect was behind the kidnapping: Prabowo.
Indonesian General Wiranto, left, with Suharto in Jakarta on February 16, 1998. Photo: AFP
“After my kidnapping, I learned that Kopassus wasn’t the only perpetrator,” Mahesa explained. “Andi Arief was taken by the police, not Kopassus. From this I conclude that the kidnapping was ordered by the former military chief at that time, Feisal Tanjung.” Feisal was replaced by General Wiranto in February 1998.
It is quite possible the country will never know the truth behind the kidnappings because of a lack of evidence. Prabowo, who was sacked soon after Suharto resigned, and many of his supporters believe that former generals at ABRI – the entity under which the police and military fell in Suharto’s era – masterminded the kidnappings and he was merely a scapegoat.
Nobody has been brought to trial for the kidnapping. Wiranto is now a minister in President Joko Widodo’s administration.

What’s made Indonesian students forget the China taboo?

Those who joined Gerindra, including Mahesa, have dismissed suggestions that they are suffering from Stockholm syndrome, a condition that causes hostages to show sympathy towards their captors.
“I really don’t care about that, I don’t think it’s funny. [The suggestion] always surfaces during election years … I’m sure if Prabowo was no longer around these statements would eventually die down,” Mahesa said. “Honestly I’m waiting for the military to come out and admit this … this is character assassination” against Prabowo.
An activist with a poster featuring the generals involved in quelling protests in 1998. Photo: AFP
Other victims’ political paths have been less controversial. Jati, for example, played a significant part in Widodo’s 2014 presidential election campaign. Arief is the deputy secretary general for the Democratic Party, which was founded by former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, while Faisol Riza is currently a legislator backed by former president Abdurrahman Wahid’s party.
While the victims might have chosen different political paths, they agree that the main goals of the Reformasi movement have yet to be achieved.

Indonesia was supposed to be embracing freedom. What happened?

These include bringing Suharto and his cronies to trial, amending the 1945 constitution, widening regional autonomy, removing the armed forces’ dual function, eradicating corruption and maintaining the rule of law.
“I think many people consider Reformasi was completed after the fall of Suharto. But the biggest question we face now, 20 years after Reformasi, is, ‘What’s next?’” said Hendri Satrio, political analyst and lecturer at Paramadina University in Jakarta, who was a student activist in 1998. “We still have homework to do … in theory, a democratic country’s biggest challenges are economic equity, legal equality and political maturity.”
Some worry Joko Widodo’s administration is eroding the freedoms fought for during Reformasi. Photo: Reuters
Others argue that the very freedoms that were fought so hard for are now under threat from the democratically elected government. In a much criticised move, the Widodo administration and parliament passed a regulation last year that allows officials to disband groups deemed a threat to national unity without judicial proceedings.

Why Indonesia’s Widodo had to throw Ahok under a bus

In a blow to free speech last month, legislators passed a controversial amendment to the 2014 Legislative Institutions Law that effectively shields politicians from public criticism by opening up criminal charges against individuals or organisations that “disrespect the dignity of the House or its members”.
These laws “are like giving the next administration a blank cheque [to oppress their political rivals]. There’s not much of a chance of me supporting Jokowi again next year if there’s no real change,” said Jati, referring to Widodo by his nickname.

“Twenty years ago it was difficult to find women wearing niqab. Now you can find them easily. Even in the mall,” says former student activist Syafiq Alielha from the country’s largest moderate Islamic group Nahdlatul Ulama.
“In the future this will undermine democracy [because] the conservative perspective doesn’t accept diversity of faith.”

Prabowo vs Widodo: what makes general think Indonesian election will be a case of second time lucky?

To Widodo’s credit, however, infrastructure, health care and education have improved since he was elected in 2014, analysts and former Reformasi activists said.
But income inequality remains and could trigger the country’s next big upheaval as the country prepares for a presidential election next year, which is expected to be a repeat of 2014 when Widodo defeated Prabowo.
“I think this country’s most urgent problem is the social and economic gap between the rich and the poor. In the remote areas of Indonesia many people still do not know what it means to live free … they are still imprisoned by limitations such as economy, education, health and access to the world,” Jati said. “If we don’t address this soon, then there’s always a chance for the next revolution.

Local Islamist radicals take toll in Indonesia

A bomb blast at Surabaya Pantekosta Center Church in Surabaya, Indonesia.
By Ross B. Taylor

The bombings of three churches and a police headquarters in the Indonesian city of Surabaya and an attack on police in Sumatra has marked a dramatic escalation of the terror threats in our region.
Few Australians know much about Surabaya, a city of 6.5 million people, even though it is close to Bali where more than one million Australians holiday each year. To travel from Surabaya to the main tourist spots on Bali is similar to travelling from Perth to Merredin — chillingly close.
Surabaya has been relatively free from major terrorist attacks until now, though many small terrorist cells have been found in the province of East Java, of which Surabaya is the capital.
So why has terrorism suddenly taken such a dramatic and despicable turn, choosing suicide as the means of inflicting death and injury, and using children who were “sacrificed” for “the greater cause” by their own parents?
Authorities don’t yet have these answers, but we do know that in the years after the Bali bombings, the Indonesian police, supported by Australia’s Federal Police, made major inroads into the activities of well-known terrorist groups such as the Abu Bakar Bashir-led Jemaah Islamiyah. As a result of this process, many members of JI fled and formed small “terror cells” with the objective of seeking an Islamic State in Indonesia.
With the collapse of Islamic State in the Middle East last year, radical Indonesians were encouraged to stay home to support the creation of a caliphate or Islamic State within their own region, targeting not only Christians but Shi’ite Muslims and also Indonesia’s national police.
Fortunately, most of these would-be terrorists lacked the skills to build bombs, but also to execute a major terrorist attack. This incompetence — that often resulted in would-be terrorists blowing themselves up — combined with the intelligence services provided by countries such as Australia — allowed Indonesian police to thwart numerous plots to cause death and fear throughout the region.
For many months now, Australia’s Foreign Minister Julie Bishop and her counterpart in Indonesia, Retno Masudi, have warned that as IS disintegrated, Indonesian fighters would return home and bring with them not only entire families who had been radicalised, but also the skills to construct sophisticated bombs, and the knowledge of how to plan and implement an attack.
What this week’s attacks in Surabaya showed was just how devastating the actions of a radicalised family could be. What we don’t know is who was behind these families, planning and developing such assaults on three churches. One thing is clear: a simple family, despite being radicalised, would be highly unlikely to have the skills to plan an attack such as that in Surabaya.
Neither would they have the bomb-making skills. So who was behind this shocking event?
One hopes it was simply a local terror cell, but more likely this is the first time we have seen the impact that returning fighters can have when using a radicalised family combined with high-level bomb-making and execution skills.
So what does this mean for Australians heading off to Bali?
With 5.2 million foreign visitors holidaying in Bali each year, and 1.1 million of them being Australians, there is an enormous incentive for our respective nations to keep Bali safe.
The sad reality is that no city is now safe from a terrorist attack.
Australians in Bali can, however, do their bit by behaving themselves — particularly during the fasting month of Ramadan that started on Tuesday — and avoiding high-profile clubs and bars.
In Surabaya, just 300km away, their citizens are trying to come to terms with the brutal and senseless acts that have shattered their city. If any “good” can come of such monstrous acts, it is that all major Islamic associations in Indonesia, and their government, are now saying, “this is enough, Islam is not about indiscriminate killing and the destruction of children’s lives, and we will stop these evil murderers”.
Let’s hope they do.
Ross B. Taylor AM is the president of the Perth-based Indonesia Institute Inc.

(This article first appeared in The West Australian Newspaper in May 2018)

Foreign Universities to open in Indonesia at last

By Ria Nurdiani

Indonesia will have at least one foreign university’s branch campus operating this year as the government finalises detailed regulations to allow them in as part of the country’s attempts to improve higher education performance. Other measures include pushing for some local universities to become ‘world-class’ by providing additional funding. 

However, it will not be a free-for-all for foreign providers. Opening up to foreign universities will be limited and will be a partnership with private universities in Indonesia. “It is not like the government has a vacancy for foreign universities to open a branch,” Patdono Suwignjo, director general for institutional development at the Ministry of Research, Technology and Higher Education, told University World News. “It is the government who is approaching the universities.”

According to Patdono, foreign universities will first be screened according to their position in international rankings, such as the QS World University Rankings. Only universities ranked above 200 can make it onto the government’s list, he said. 

The government will determine where the universities can operate and which subjects can be offered under the collaboration. The priority is for subjects not available or yet to be developed in Indonesia, he said. 

Science, technology, engineering, mathematics, business and management have been mentioned as priority subject areas.

“The government is hoping for at least one Australian university to open a branch this year,” Patdono said, but declined to name the institution. Previously the ministry had indicated that the University of Melbourne and the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology (RMIT) had fulfilled the government's requirements.

Earlier this year Muhammad Nasir, Indonesia's research, technology and higher education minister, told a press conference in Jakarta up to 10 universities were looking to take up the government’s offer “by the middle of the year”, and said two top Australian universities, the University of Melbourne and the University of Queensland, and the University of Cambridge in the United Kingdom had “expressed an interest” in operating in Indonesia.

He has suggested that the “capital involvement” of foreign universities would be up to 67%. 

Employment of foreign academics

To accelerate the process, the government issued Presidential Regulation No 20, 2018, in March on the employment of foreign workers to simplify procedures and make it easier for foreign lecturers, among others, to obtain work permits in Indonesia, although this has sparked concerns by local lecturers that they may compete with them for jobs. 

The government also announced last month that it was opening up opportunities for foreign academics to become permanent lecturers in Indonesian universities as part of its drive to push up standards, suggesting that some 200 foreign lecturers could be recruited. 

The ministry is currently preparing the supporting regulations, including the possibility of a new type of visa for academics. Currently, foreign lecturers are not permitted to reside permanently in the country.

The government enacted a controversial law in 2012 allowing foreign universities to open a branch in Indonesia with government approval as long as they are not-for-profit, collaborate with Indonesian universities and emphasise the hiring of local lecturers. 

But the government appeared to be vacillating, with President Joko Widodo saying in February that he did not want to “hastily execute the plan” just in order to improve the quality of higher education but give local institutions a chance to improve first. 

On the other hand, the government spends huge amounts on scholarships for Indonesians to study abroad. 

But the entry of Australian universities will also depend on an Australia-Indonesia free trade agreement known as the Indonesia-Australia Comprehensive Economic Partnership, which is expected to be signed by August and includes foreign education providers and is likely to include foreign investment in education. 

Top five universities set to be world class

President Widodo set a target when he took office in 2014 of making some Indonesian universities ‘world class’. Last month Nasir repeated the target of five ‘world-class’ Indonesian universities within the next two years.

Indonesia’s top five universities, namely Universitas Indonesia, Bandung Institute of Technology, Gadjah Mada University, Airlangga University and Bogor Agricultural University, are targeted to become a world-class university by 2019. “Government wants their rank to be upgraded, at least above 200,” said Patdono.

Based on the QS World University Rankings, Universitas Indonesia is ranked 277, while Bandung Institute of Technology is at 331, Gadjah Mada University is around the 401-410 mark, and Airlangga University and Bogor Agricultural University are ranked 701-750 and 751-800, respectively.

Patdono said since 2016, these universities had been receiving additional funds of IDR10 billion (approximately US$708,500) a year per university to fulfil the QS world-class criteria. “The budget is for hiring more lecturers, research funding,” said Patdono, referring to the faculty to student ratio and research paper citations per faculty in the rankings criteria.

Nonetheless Patdono admitted that in Indonesia “the disparity is so huge”, with universities outside Java island lagging. The government is trying to narrow the gap by providing additional funds to private universities on a competitive basis, he said. 

“The budget [of IDR1 billion per university] is not much; it is limited actually. But we hope it can improve the criteria related to world-class university assessments,” he said. 

Australia can help Indonesia kick-the-habit

By Madeleine Randall

Australia is an undisputed world leader in tobacco control. From massive wins with plain packaging to widely enforced bans on smoking in public places, it is easy to see why. Australia is successfully creating a generational shift in tobacco use, with its youngest generation growing up in a society mostly free of smoking and its harmful effects.
Yet Stephen Grenville’s recent observations for The Interpreter (“Quitting cigarettes in Indonesia”) highlight that there are some very serious failings in tobacco control in the immediate neighbourhood which must be addressed. The rampant and persuasive cigarette advertising in Indonesia that Grenville notes is only the tip of the iceberg in a country with a massive tobacco problem, a problem that won’t go away without help. 
Indonesia is poised to become a leading regional economy in coming decades, yet it also continues to have one of the highest rates of smoking in the world. The economic burden of tobacco use is a serious threat not only to Indonesia’s ability to reach its economic potential, but also, as a result, to Australia’s interests in the country as a strategic partner in our region.
Considering that the recent Foreign Policy White Paper called for government action to promote a prosperous region and encourage sustainable development, it would be a gross oversight not to take tobacco and its health impacts into account in Australia’s regional engagement. 
But just how bad is the problem? In hard numbers, 2013 data shows that more than 60% of Indonesian adults are smokers, and as of 2014, one in three children aged 13–15 smoked. With the prevalence of smoking among Indonesia’s poor increasing from 30% in 2001 to 43.8% in 2013, tobacco is also disproportionately affecting those who can least afford it. Restrictions are few – cigarettes are easily purchased by children, and advertising is ubiquitous.
The pervasiveness of tobacco places an economic burden on society which will undoubtedly effect Indonesia’s anticipated rise to power. Diseases attributable to tobacco use, such as stroke and coronary heart disease, are a drain on Indonesia’s healthcare system, costing the country 1.85 trillion rupiahs (approximately US$192 million) in 2010.
Another critical concern is the rate at which children are taking up the habit, putting the next-generation workforce at risk of facing debilitating diseases in what should be the prime of their lives. A workforce that is unable to work poses a further risk to Indonesia’s future economic hopes. 
Yet a major roadblock to tobacco control efforts is Indonesia’s failure to ratify the World Health Organization’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. This has meant that tobacco control advocates face a constant battle for government support to enforce proven, highly effective measures for reducing consumption, such as taxation and restrictions on advertising and smoking in public places.
This lax approach makes tobacco control a high-risk area for Australia to support with investment in Indonesia. However, that should not be an excuse to sit by idly. Instead, there is an opportunity to expand investments in Indonesia and design programs aimed at targeting the wide range of factors that negatively impact health in the country.
Health is unfortunately the lowest priority in Australia’s aid program to Indonesia, accounting for a paltry 2% of the total spent, which does not make for a good start. Australia does, however, allocate 33% of its aid spending in Indonesia to education, and it is perhaps here the contribution might be best placed.
Driving a change in behaviour among Indonesia’s youth might be where Australia could most help Indonesia gain ground in the fight against tobacco. The Australia–Indonesia Centre Health Cluster has already twigged to the importance of engaging youth, recently funding a number of youth-focused projects designed to raise awareness about non-communicable disease risk factors early in life. Two initiatives in particular aim to change the attitudes and behaviours of adolescents towards tobacco use through school-based programs.
In addition, a collaboration between Flinders University and Syiah Kuala University in Banda Aceh has found that a school-based smoking prevention program increased students’ knowledge of the negative effects of smoking. This model is widely used in many countries but remains under-researched in Indonesia.
Increased earmarking of funds towards projects within the education portion of the Australian budget to Indonesia would allow local civil society organisations and universities in the country to research, evaluate, and scale up school-based programs, which in turn could stem the demand for cigarettes among youth. 
There is a long way to go with tobacco control in Indonesia, and an Australian contribution would only be one piece of that complex puzzle. By targeting youth, however, it would present an opportunity to drive long-term change in smoking behaviours, while remaining in line with the strategic goals of Australia’s aid program in Indonesia.
Encouraging Indonesia’s youth to say no to tobacco, to help them create a healthier society and a stronger economy, will ultimately benefit Australia and contribute to regional growth and stability.

Sunday, May 6, 2018

'Strangers next Door": Can these two neighbours ever 'hit-it-off'?

Book Review by Duncan Graham

The missed chances of history.
Long before the First Fleet arrived from Great Britain to colonize Australia in 1788, Makassans already knew of the Great South Land.
They regularly sailed to its northern shores, staying for about six months collecting and drying the edible trepan sea slug for export. Then they left for their homeland — sometimes taking Aboriginal wives.
Had they explored further and settled, Terra Australis might now be part of Indonesia Raya (Great Indonesia).
Instead we have two widely differing cultures and value systems squashed so closely they are interdependent yet wishing otherwise — not the basis for a good marriage.
Melbourne University professor Tim Lindsey is co-editor with Dave McRae from the same campus of Strangers Next Door?
Lindsey is a rarity — a scholar who keyboards with journalistic directness. His favorite tag is “The Odd Couple” of Southeast Asia. Though a bit dated for Netflixers (the Neil Simon play and film go back half a century) it’s handy shorthand.
Former editor-in-chief of The Jakarta Post Endy Bayuni, one of six Indonesian contributors, is a mite more expansive: The two nations’ “relationship has been defined more by what separates them than by what unites them, especially in recent years”.
Realities underpin his gloom; Australia’s support for the 1999 East Timor referendum, which saw the tiny province get independence aroused widespread wrath that lingers still.
Australians see their involvement as a human-rights triumph, Indonesians as a sinister plot to fracture the “Unitary State”.
If only that was the sole irritant. The fatuous phone-taps on Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the one president who genuinely liked Australia, haven’t been forgotten. Nor has the gross misstep by former prime minister Tony Abbott linking the 2004 Aceh tsunami aid to failed pleas to save two reformed Australian drug runners from execution.
Central to so many clashes is the clumsiness of Australian leaders and their inability — or wilful refusal — to see things from another perspective. And when they try they become sycophants.
On the other side Indonesian politicians can be over eager to play the racism and colonialism cards, telling electors they are victims, their problems made by outsiders.
Michael Bachelard spent three challenging years in the archipelago reporting for Fairfax Press. He was told by a President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo adviser that Australian journalists were “too aggressive, too blunt in our language, too critical and prone to sensationalism”.
This image, unfair to the now foreign editor for The Age “who had grown to love Indonesia and its people” kept him out of the Palace while colleagues from the United States, the United Kingdom and the Middle East got access to the President.
Why should the third-largest democracy (after the US and India) have such hang-ups about a neighbor that supported Indonesia’s independence from Dutch colonialism and until recently was a major aid donor?
There are plenty of historical explanations: Founding president Sukarno’s dabbling with Russia when the advance of communism was terrifying the West, led to failed regime-change attempts by the United States, and Indonesia’s ill-fated Konfrontasi challenge to independent Malaysia defended by Commonwealth troops.
More up-to-date is Lindsey’s “Bad News” list of Australians getting in trouble on Bali and how this affects bilateral relations.
It could all be grim but the question mark in the title suggests hope. Professor David Hill’s Australian Consortium for In-Country Indonesian Studies shows what can be done by a determined individual and a handful of true believers.
University cooperation between Flinders (in South Australia) and Gadjah Mada in Yogyakarta is another example of doers elbowing naysayers aside.
The final chapter highlights the benefits of youth programs. All worthy, but only eight considered and so small they’re dust flecks on the mountain of need.
Although the Indonesian population is skewed to the young (40 percent is under 25) the power brokers are still last century’s oligarchs. They also control the media.
Threatening the relationship is the future of Papua. Melbourne academic Richard Chauvel writes that while Australia has “the most interest in a peaceful resolution” policy has been “immobilized” by Indonesian “paranoia” about Australia’s intentions.
The independence activists working out of Australia are not supported by the government; Indonesians with limited understanding of democracy can’t fathom why the peaceful stirrers aren’t arrested.
The issue of transiting asylum seekers stranded in Indonesia remains unresolved. Monash academic Antje Missbach’s contribution sounds alerts.
This book has been published in the UK by a legal-book publishing company. The cover price of £90 (US$126, Rp 1.7 million) guarantees it won’t reach those who would benefit most.
The fact that top academics like Lindsey and McRae couldn’t excite a local publisher proves the point made by many contributors — Australians are indifferent to the people next door and only see them as a market for wheat and beef.
Nasty — but a reality bounce when the ASEAN conference in Sydney generated so much banquet-talk about warming ties. Though desperately needed these won’t come without robust but respectful exchanges.
Relationships just bob around, almost directionless. The ocean is currently calm. That’s temporary. More understanding, port and starboard, is needed to weather the inevitable storms. This book provides some ballast.
____Duncan Graham is a well-know and respected journalist based in East Java.____________________________________________
Strangers Next Door?
Edited by Tim Lindsey and Dave McRae
Hart Publishing, Oxford, UK, 2018