Friday, November 11, 2016

What does Jokowi want for the Indonesian economy?

Eve Warburton, ANU

This time last year, most analysts saw Indonesia’s President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) as weak and overwhelmed by the challenges of national politics. Now, after two years in the job, he is viewed as the undisputed ‘boss’ of his administration. Over the course of the year, Jokowi expanded his governing coalition in parliament, left opposition forces in tatters and asserted his authority over a fractious cabinet.

Indonesian President Joko Widodo at the House of Representative building in Jakarta (Photo: Reuters).

The question now is not whether Jokowi can consolidate political power, but what he wants to do with it.
Over the past 12 months, a Jokowi-styled developmentalism begun to emerge. The president has settled on a narrow set of economic priorities, in the service of which he has promoted a state-led, pragmatic policy execution. He wants to oversee an infrastructure boom and leave a tangible economic legacy. Other political and economic problems — corruption, good governance, human rights — are subordinate to this singular goal and clearly expendable in the eyes of the president.

Most of the administration’s major policy innovations are geared towards realising ambitious infrastructure goals. Jokowi is cultivating the image of a can-do president, one willing to don a hardhat, roll up his sleeves, and get things done quickly. In a bid to attract desperately needed infrastructure investment, Jokowi is telling the world that Indonesia is open for business.

But does this amount to an identifiable philosophy of economic leadership?

There is nothing transformative about Jokowi’s economic agenda. He simply wants a fast and no-frills implementation of an old statist development strategy that has loomed large throughout Indonesia’s history.
Indeed, there are uncanny echoes of the past in this new developmentalism. In recent months we’ve seen in the media a stream of comparisons between Jokowi and Suharto, the New Order autocrat who governed Indonesia for 32 years. Known as the ‘Father of Development’, Suharto oversaw a long period of economic transformation during which the idea of modernisation — symbolised by infrastructure development — was a fundamental part of the regime’s ideology and the autocrat’s political legitimacy.
Of course, the similarities should not be overstated. New Order developmentalism was repressive, whereas Jokowi has no anti-democratic designs. Today Indonesia is the most stable democratic country in Southeast Asia.

Still, the reaction from Indonesia’s commentariat is telling. It appears that Jokowi has tapped into a ‘widespread — though diffuse — mood of nostalgia for the certainties of the New Order’ and those golden years of economic achievement. The public have embraced Jokowi’s narrow developmental agenda. An October 2016 poll shows 69 per cent of Indonesians are satisfied with the president’s performance — Jokowi’s highest ratings since coming to office. For many Indonesians, Jokowi may be the kind of president to resurrect the developmental success of Indonesia’s recent past.

But is he?

Jokowi’s developmentalism is marked by contradiction. His promise of liberal reform is accompanied by a renewed commitment to the statist-nationalist economic model. To the private sector and foreign investors, the president casts his economic reform packages as a ‘big bang’ deregulation program. But these reforms are highly circumscribed. And to the Indonesian public, the administration is careful to emphasise that deregulation is not a turn toward liberalisation.

Jokowi sees the state sector as a locomotive for fast development, and he has injected millions of dollars into state-owned companies and handed them strategic infrastructure contracts. There are plans afoot to establish giant state-owned holding companies – an innovation designed to give SOEs greater leverage to borrow more money. Meanwhile, interventionist policies persist, often in the name of downstream industrialisation and food self-sufficiency.

Foreign analysts constantly lament the administration’s ‘mixed messages’. But what are the sources of this contradiction?

The president is not an ideologue; most refer to him as a pragmatist. It seems, though, that Jokowi is embracing the tailwinds of an economic nationalism he inherited. He took the reins of power at a time of rising protectionism and anti-foreign mobilisation. Nationalist policies are popular among Indonesia’s political class and the broader public too, and scholars of Indonesia’s economic history argue that all governments have oscillated between liberalism and nationalism. In many ways, Jokowi is simply acting out the ideological tensions that have long characterised Indonesia’s economic landscape.

Jokowi’s personality is also to blame. The president’s leadership style and decision-making process are unpredictable. Jokowi surrounds himself with very different kinds of economic thinkers. At times he embraces the ideas of pro-market advisors, but then pursues statist-nationalist policies endorsed by his personal partisans.

Jokowi is defined by ad hockery. He deals with each problem in isolation, and sometimes without wide consultation. Jokowi can be fickle, even erratic, in his management of people and policies. In two years, his administration has had three trade ministers, three coordinating ministers for natural resources, two finance ministers and four energy ministers – all with different approaches to problems of investment, trade and growth. It is, therefore, difficult to predict how he’ll manage an increasingly complex set of budget challenges, attract investors, and realise ambitious infrastructure targets.

Jokowi’s developmentalist agenda also risks crumbling under a host of political and economic hazards. The president’s approval ratings are highly contingent upon inflation and oil prices. The budget is under pressure, and some of Jokowi’s flagship policies — the deregulation packages, the 35,000mw project — face a range of logistical, political and financial challenges.

 At this stage, if such hazards materialise, Jokowi’s narrow developmentalism will fall flat, and he will have little else to take to the 2019 elections.

Eve Warburton is a PhD Candidate at the Department of Political and Social Change in the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, The Australian National University.
This piece is based on longer article that will appear in the December edition of the Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, and which she presented at the ANU’s Indonesia Update in September 2016.

Indonesia's Widodo, a maverick no longer

Hamish McDonald

Bakrie was ousted and replaced by Setya Novanto, who was forced to resign as parliamentary speaker last year after a secret recording showed him trying to shake down the country's largest gold and copper mining company, Freeport. Setya duly brought Golkar over to the government side. Two Islamist-oriented parties followed.

In July, Widodo followed up with a cabinet reshuffle that handed out small rewards to the new recruits while ruthlessly putting down ministers who had proved too argumentative or popular for his liking.
Former army general Luhut Panjaitan was demoted from his post as co-ordinating minister for political, legal and security affairs, which had allowed him to look like a prime minister. His new co-ordinating position covers maritime affairs and natural resources, which supervises key economic sectors, while his high-profile old job has gone to former military commander Wiranto, leader of a small coalition party.
Widodo dropped two noted reformists. One was Anies Baswedan, the education minister and a former university rector who was trying to raise standards. The other was Sudirman Said, a former anti-corruption campaigner, who as minister for petroleum and mineral resources had tackled endemic graft in the energy sector.

The major positive step was the return of economist Sri Mulyani Indrawati as finance minister, a post she had occupied under the previous administration of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono until her crackdown on tax avoidance, involving Golkar's Bakrie among others, got her sacked, followed by her departure to a senior World Bank job.

Economics takes priority

Sri Mulyani's appointment aside, the new ministerial line-up suggests Widodo has subordinated questions of human rights and corruption to his goals of lifting Indonesia to a higher economic growth path through infrastructure projects and increased exploitation of maritime resources.
Elevating Wiranto raised eyebrows around the world. In 2003, United Nations investigators indicted him for crimes against humanity over the actions of soldiers under his command during East Timor's independence vote in 1999.

The focus of Widodo's anti-corruption policy is now "prevention" rather than punishment, which makes Jakarta's political establishment much more comfortable. Meanwhile, Budi has been given a powerful position as head of the National Intelligence Agency, or BIN, which has both domestic and foreign roles.
Warburton calls it a "new developmentalism," echoing themes of the former military-backed strongman Suharto, though now in a democratic setting. Widodo's trade and investment policies also draw on Indonesia's persistent leanings toward economic nationalism and state capitalism. The rebound in Widodo's poll rating shows this is striking a chord with the public.

Yet Widodo seems to have built conflict into his cabinet. His minister for state-owned enterprises, Rini Soemarno, is trying to consolidate the 119 SOEs into more efficient groups in each industrial sector, while making sure they get the lead role in big infrastructure projects despite most of them lacking capital and technology, being excessively bureaucratic and headed by incompetent political appointees.
Sri Mulyani, however, has been handed responsibility for this huge task as Megawati has blocked Soemarno from appearing in the parliament since last year because of personal antagonisms. The policy also faces problems if Widodo pursues his stated aim of having Indonesia join the Trans Pacific Partnership, which bars member countries from giving preference to their SOEs in contracts.

Government intervention

Government decisions on investments are also slowing projects. In March, Widodo overruled a decision by the petroleum ministry to approve a plan by a consortium led by Japan's Inpex and Shell to develop the Abadi natural gas field in the eastern Arafura Sea by using a floating plant to produce 7.5 million tons of liquefied natural gas annually.

Instead, Widido ordered the partners to pipe the gas 170km across a deep and unstable sea trench to an onshore plant in the remote and undeveloped Tanimbar islands. The change is expected to delay the project up to four years, and add $4.5 billion to the previous $14.8 billion development cost -- assuming Inpex and Shell still see it worth developing.

Now that his own standing is more assured, Widodo's immediate political task is to help his former Jakarta city hall deputy, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, retain the governorship of the capital city in local elections in February. Basuki is of Chinese descent and a Christian in a mostly-Muslim city where some imams are already saying voting for him would be haram (sinful).

Since the Jakarta governorship was his own springboard to the presidency, Widodo wants to prevent a more popular candidate from winning while also loyally helping his trusted and capable former deputy. Appointment of the controversial Budi as BIN chief was the price he paid to Megawati to persuade her party to support Basuki instead of another candidate.

As it is, Basuki is facing two strong opponents. One is the sacked education minister, Anies Baswedan, who is now backed by Prabowo's opposition party, the other is Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono, an army major who is the son of former president Yudhoyono.

If Basuki suffers an election defeat, it might suddenly make Widodo look more vulnerable as he seeks re-election in 2019. In the meantime, he is riding high using conventional political tactics. As Chatib Basri, a former finance minister, told the ANU conference: "Every president after six months becomes a normal president." It has just taken Widodo a bit longer.

Hamish McDonald is a former correspondent in Jakarta, and author of "Suharto's Indonesia" and "Demokrasi: Indonesia in the 21st Century".

 This article first appeared in The Asia Strategic Review on 17th October 2016